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Notes
CRIMINAL LAw-Ex POST FACTO DOCTRINE-NEGLIGENT HOMI-
CIDE--Sometime between July 18, 1940, and May 6, 1942, the
defendant contractors negligently deviated from specifications in
the installation of gas pipes beneath the structure of a certain
housing project. This negligence resulted in a leakage, and the
consequent accumulation of gas under the project caused a vio-
lent explosion on February 19, 1946. The Louisiana Criminal
Code' meanwhile became law on July 29, 1942, three months
after the negligent acts occurred. This law changed the old crime
of involuntary manslaughter to negligent homicide,2 making it
easier for the state to obtain a conviction.3 It was under the new
negligent homicide statute that the state charged the defendants.
The defense was that its application was ex post facto, and a
denial of liberty without due process of law. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court sustained the defense and affirmed a judgment
quashing the indictment. State v. Masino, 43 So. (2d) 685 (La.
1950).
The court resolved the issues down to the question: When
did the crime occur? The analysis proceeded along these lines:
If the act of the defendants, the negligent installation of piping,
be defined as the crime, then the statute allegedly violated would
be ex post facto in its application to the persons charged. On the
other hand, if the crime were not committed until the fatal ex-
plosion occurred, this act of the legislature would not be retro-
active in operation. Delivering the opinion of the majority of
the court, Justice Moise concluded that the crime was committed
on the date on which the deed, the original act, was performed,
and not on the date of the victim's death. 4 It is this analysis, and
not the actual holding that the law was ex post facto in its appli-
cation, which is questioned.
It should be noted that although the ex post facto doctrine
is fairly simple, the question of the application of that doctrine
to the instant case is not free from difficulty. The nature of the
ex post facto doctrine, and the reasons for its existence are
1. La. R.S. (1950) tit. 14.
2. Art. 32, La. Criminal Code of 1942 [La. R.S. (1950) § 14:32].
3. See the majority opinion of State v. Masino, 43 So.(2d) 685, 686 (La.
1950), for the view that the new criminal code Article 32 was a burden on
the defendants. But see Justice McCaleb's dissent, id. at 689.
4. 43 So.(2d) 685, 686 (La. 1950).
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worthy of comment.5 In the leading case of Calder v. Bull6 the
United States Supreme Court classically defined an ex post facto
law as one which (1) makes an act criminal that was innocent
when done, (2) makes a crime greater than it was when done,
(3) inflicts a greater punishment for a crime than was attached
to it when committed, or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence
to the prejudice of the offender. In general, an ex post facto law
deprives an offender of some advantage that he enjoyed when
he acted, or imposes some disadvantages from which he was free
when he acted. In speaking for the court in Calder v. Bull, Mr.
Justice Chase significantly declared:
"This fundamental principle flows from the very nature of
our free republican governments, that no man should be
compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain
from acts which the law permits. '7
"The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law con-
cerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious mean-
ing and intention of the prohibition is this: that the Legis-
latures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact
done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation to
such fact, and shall punish him for having done it."'5
These observations call attention to at least one outstanding
principle contained in the ex post facto prohibition-that the
doctrine is concerned with the conduct of an individual who
believes that he is within the law in his behavior. The theory
is based on the notion that a man should be permitted to rely
on the law existing at the time of his act. The prevailing law
is his guide, and the prohibition against ex post facto legislation
is to prevent the changing of that law so as to create criminal
responsibility after the individual has depended upon it. Yet in
the instant case the court failed to invoke this principle in its
reasoning. No emphasis was placed upon the fact that the de-
fendants had already performed their acts before the passage
of the law which they were charged with violating. Instead, the
court concluded that the crime had been committed at the time
of the negligent conduct which later resulted in the explosion
and deaths.
5. The Constitution of the United States prohibits the passage of ex
post facto laws by the Congress (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10), and by the legis-
latures of the several states (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10).
6. 3 U.S. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798).
7. 3 U.S. 386, 388, 1 LEd. 648, 649.
8. 3 U.S. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 650.
NOTES
The categorical statement that a crime is committed when
the offender performs his act is open to serious objection. Since
some crimes occur over an extended period of time, it is only
with extreme difficulty that the exact time of the commission of
the crime can be established. These situations simply do not lend
themselves to this type of factual analysis. Although this is true,
it is at the same time possible to determine the time of com-
pletion of such crimes. It is not until some prescribed criminal
consequences have been produced by an act that the crime is
complete. A crime is not the individual's act, nor the conse-
quences of his act. It is rather a combination of the two ele-
mentsY For a crime to exist, both must prevail; neither alone
will suffice. The very fact that the court rationalized in terms of
act plus consequences, instead of dealing with acts alone, indi-
cates its realization of this concept. In the present case the care-
less installation of pipe by the defendants was a necessary fac-
tor of criminal liability; but standing alone, it did not constitute
a crime.
It is respectfully submitted that this case calls for the plain
application of the ex post facto theory, and nothing more; it
was the time of the defendants' conduct alone that should have
received the attention of the court.
That the court recognized the basic purposes for the prohi-
bition against ex post facto statutes is evidenced by the ultimate
result. But the fact that the consequences of the defendants' acts
occurred after the effective date of Article 32 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code confused the issue so that although the court
decided correctly, it was drawn to tangents of irrelevancy which
could produce unintended results. They attempted to reconcile
the decision with a definition of when a crime was committed.
Fortunately, there was no compulsion to do so.
GENE W. LAFITTE
LABOR LAW - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INJUNCTION AGAINST
PEACEFUL PICKETING -Defendants, members of a labor union
composed in part of retail ice peddlers, sought to induce non-
union peddlers to join the union by obtaining from the whole-
sale ice distributors in Kansas City agreements not to sell ice
to non-union peddlers. When the plaintiff, Empire Storage and
Ice Company, refused to agree after all other distributors had
9. See the cases of Brockway v. State of Indiana, 192 Ind. 656 (1923)
and Alderson v. State of Indiana, 196 Ind. 22 (1925).
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